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THE FDA AND THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY:
A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP?
Tanya E. Karwaki
Abstract: Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulatory reform has become a
controversial, politically charged issue of particular significance to the biotechnology
industry. The fundamental factors driving the movement for FDA reform include the
prohibitive costs associated with developing a product approved by the FDA and the pressure
to participate in the international harmonization of biotechnology product regulations. Two
recent Congressional bills, Senator Kassebaum's Food and Drug Administration Performance
and Accountability Act of 1995, and Representative Burr's Drug and Biological Products
Reform Act of 1996 provide vehicles for analyzing the direction and goals of FDA reform as
they apply specifically to the biotechnology industry.
The 104th Congress has been avid in its examination of federal
agencies. Among the agencies it has been reviewing are the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the Internal Revenue Service.' Not surprisingly, the United States
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with regulatory authority over
products accounting for twenty-five cents of every consumer dollar, or
over $1 trillion annually,2 is also being closely examined in this
atmosphere of regulatory reform.
This is not the first time Congress, trade associations, consumer
groups, and the executive branch have focused on reforming the FDA. In
the late 1970s a Congressional attempt to streamline the drug approval
process failed when consumer and industry groups withdrew support for
legislation advocated by Senator Edward Kennedy In the 1980s, AIDS
activists were successful in seeking FDA reform establishing fast tracks
for experimental drugs that might help dying individuals.4 More recently,
in the 1990s, Vice President Gore's program for reinventing government
streamlined, to some extent, regulations governing biotechnology
I. Karen Kerrigan, FDA Is Squandering Its Goodwill With Industries, St. Louis Bus. J., Oct. 16,
1995.
2. Note, FDA Reform and the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 2009,
2009 (1995).
3. Andrew Lawler & Richard Stone, FDA: Congress Mixes Harsh Medicine, 269 Science 1038,
1038 (1995).
4. 21 C.F.R. § 312.80. For a discussion of changes in drug regulation in response to the AIDS
crisis see Julie C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An International
Approach, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 229 (1995) and Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug
Regulation: Past, Present, and Beyond the Year 2000, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 123, 135 (1995).
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products.5 While changes to date have been applauded by some FDA
critics, many want more.
Until recently, cries for reform did not meet with significant support
from Congress, but with the Republican congressional election victories
in November 1994, legislation to reform the FDA reappeared on the
Capital Hill agenda.6 In conjunction with the legislative approach, other
players involved with FDA regulation, including, the Clinton
Administration, the FDA itself, trade associations, consumer advocacy
groups, and several think tanks, have become more active in proposing
changes and voicing concerns. The biotechnology industry itself also has
taken a high profile stance in the ensuing debate.
The biotechnology industry can make a substantial contribution to
U.S. economic growth and quality of life.7 Therefore, biotechnology, as
an industry, is sufficiently important to warrant development of a
comprehensive regulatory plan that takes into account the industry's, as
well as the public's, needs.8 If industry needs are not met, the threat
exists that the industry will focus its attentions abroad, taking with it new
discoveries and jobs.9
This Comment explores the effects of market forces and pressure from
the biotechnology industry on FDA reform with regard to the regulation
of biotechnology products.'" It examines recently proposed measures of
reform, their likelihood of success in the current political environment,
and how these measures will shape the future of FDA reform. More
specifically, it analyzes Senator Kassebaum's bill, the Food and Drug
Administration and Accountability Act of 1995," and Representative
Burr's bill, the Drug and Biological Products Reform Act of 1996,12 in
terms of their effectiveness in responding to the problems which gave
5. Clinton, Wyden Offer FDA Reforms; Several Match BIO Recommendations, Biotechnology
Newswatch 4, Apr. 17, 1995; Reginald Rhein, FDA Reform: Gore Unveils Changes for Biotech,
Congress Readies New Bill, Biotechnology Newswatch I, Nov. 20, 1995.
6. Daniel Green, FDA Under Fire from U.S. Conservatives: They Complain that the Agency Is
Controlled by Left-wingers Who Want Zero-risk Products, Fin. Post, Aug. 23, 1995.
7. Competitiveness of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1994) [hereinafter
Competitiveness of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry].
8. Id. at 20.
9. 142 Cong. Rec. H2464-02 (1996) (statement of Representative Fox).
10. Although biotechnology products may be regulated as drugs, biologics, devices, or any
combination thereof, this Comment is limited to drugs and biologics. See Gary E. Gamerman,
Regulation of Biologics Manufacturing: Questioning the Premise, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 213 (1994).
11. S. 1477, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
12. H.R. 3199, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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rise to the movement for FDA reform, and in terms of their impact on the
long-term interests of the United States with respect to the global
biotechnology industry. Emphasis is placed on these bills because they
are relatively moderate proposals which, even if not enacted, are likely to
provide a starting point for future legislative attempts at FDA reform, as
well as guiding future internal FDA reform.
Part I of this Comment reviews the FDA laws governing
biotechnology products and examines the biotechnology industry. Part II
discusses the reasons for the current focus on FDA reform and identifies
the primary actors involved in reforming the FDA. Part III examines the
various types of reforms being proposed or implemented, and evaluates
whether Senator Kassebaum's bill and Representative Burr's bill meet
the needs of the biotechnology industry and promote the long-term
economic interests of the United States in this industry. Part IV
concludes with a discussion of the direction of future FDA reform.
I. INTRODUCTION TO FDA REGULATIONS AND THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
A. FDA Regulation of Drugs and Biologics
Drugs and biologics are regulated differently by the FDA, 3 although
both may be produced through the use of biotechnology. 4 Drugs are
defined, in part, as "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease,"' 5 and are regulated by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938"6 (FDCA) and the Drug
Amendments of 1962." The FDCA imposes stringent restrictions against
the adulteration or misbranding of drugs, 8 and requires that companies
file a new drug application before a drug can enter interstate commerce."
The Drug Amendments of 196220 expand the scientific, technical, and
13. Gamerman, supra note 10, at 213.
14. See part I.B. infra.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1994).
16. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395)
(1988 & Supp. 1994). For a history of drug approval in the United States, including a chronology of
acts preceding the FDCA, see David W. Jordan, Note, International Regulatory Harmonization: A
New Era in Prescription Drug Approval, 25 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 471 (1992).
17. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-381) (1988
& Supp. 1994).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 331.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355.
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b).
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administrative requirements for obtaining drug approval.2' The
amendments require drug sponsors to prove that new drugs are effective,
as well as safe for their intended use.22 Additionally, under these
amendments, drug sponsors must gain FDA approval before beginning
clinical testing.23 The approval process for drugs cunently includespreclinical testing, the gational Exemption for a New Drug
(IND) stage testing,25 the New Drug Application (NDA) stage testing,
26
and post marketing surveillance.27 The statutory time ftame for drug
approval under the FDCA is six to thirteen months.28
Biologics include "any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative ...applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of diseases."29 They are regulated under
the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act) of 1944.3" Un *ike the FDCA
focus on the safety and efficacy of the final drug product, the PHS Act
focuses on the rigid control of the manufacturing process of biologics.3
21. Jordan, supra note 16, at 477.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 478.
24. During preclinical testing the drug sponsor tests the drug on laboratory animals in order to
determine if it is reasonably safe for human beings. See id. at 479.
25. IND stage testing includes three phases of clinical investigations in which the drug is tested on
human beings. Data are gathered concerning the drug's toxicity, effectiveness. and safety. See id. at
480.
26. During the NDA stage extensive information must be filed with the FDA, whose staff review
the information. See id. at 481-82.
27. The goal of post market surveillance studies is to obtain further infomiation on the drug's
safety and efficacy. See id. at 483.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1). The time frame specifies a maximum 180 day limit for initial FDA
review, a 120 day limit for hearing preparation if required, and a 90 day limit for application
approval. According to these time limits, excluding voluntary extensions, new drugs must be
approved within 180 to 390 days. However, statutory limitations are exceeded on a regular basis. See
part II infra.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1988 & Supp. 1994). Typically, biologics are more complex molecules than
drugs. See Gamerman, supra note 10, at 215.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 262.
31. Gamerman, supra note 10, at 213. The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
partially relaxed the manufacturing restriction with the November 1992 cooperative manufacturing
policy, which formally recognized policy contrmct manufacturing as a manufacturing option. Id. at
225. More recently the FDA announced a six-point plan aimed at easing biotechnology regulation.
The six-point plan includes: eliminating the establishment license application for well-characterized
therapeutic biotechnology drugs, abolishing the FDA's lot-by-lot release for well-characterized and
therapeutic biologic drugs, and a commitment from the FDA to respond within 30 days to
information submitted in response to a clinical hold on a study of an investigational drug or biologic.
BIO Welcomes U.S. FDA Proposals, Biotechnology Bus. News 1, Nov. 22, 1995. Although these are
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Emphasis is placed on the manufacturing process due to the historical
nature of biologics, which were originally crude mixtures or biological
extracts prone to contamination.
32
The FDA uses the definition of a drug, combined with the definition
of a device,33 to trigger the application of the FDCA to biological
products. 4 In this way the FDA may apply the safety and efficacy
requirements of the FDCA to biologics. a5 Biologics, therefore, are often
required to meet safety, potency, purity, and efficacy criteria, reflecting
the literal requirements of both the PHS Act and the FDCA. This
regulatory scheme imposes expensive and time consuming obstacles on
the biotechnology industry.
Within the FDA infrastructure, biologics fall within the jurisdiction of
the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, drugs fall within the
jurisdiction of the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, and devices
fall within the jurisdiction of the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health. 6 Which center has jurisdiction, and hence which center's
regulatory scheme is applied, depends on how a biotechnology product is
classified. 7 Because some biotechnology products have characteristics
which meet multiple statutory and scientific definitions, both the FDA
and industry have difficulty distinguishing the jurisdictional status of
many biologics from traditional drugs.3 8 Furthermore, during the 1980s,
the FDA began classifying biotechnology products on an ad hoc, rather
than a principled, basis.39 For example, diagnostic kits for blood borne
diseases are regulated as devices, with the exception of those kits used to
screen for HIV and hepatitis, which are regulated as biologics4a This
important steps, they do not solve all the problems associated with getting a biotechnology product
to market.
32. Gamerman, supra note 10, at 213.
33. Device is defined, in part, as an "instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance,
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . . which is intended for use in the
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals." 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
34. Korwek, supra note 4, at 126.
35. Id. at 129.
36. See Gamerman, supra note 10, at 215.
37. In 1991 the FDA promulgated guidelines explaining the regulatory jurisdiction of each FDA
Center. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,756 (1991) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 3).
38. Gamerman, supra note 10, at 221.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 228. Another example of ad hoc classification can be seen in the regulation of
recombinant growth hormone and insulin as drugs, while recombinant erythropoietin is regulated as
a biologic. Id. at 228 n.68.
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method of product classification has resulted in a loss of the
predictability needed by the industry to plan how products will be
developed and brought to market.4
The FDA regulates biotechnology under laws that were enacted long
before the emergence of today's biotechnology industry.42 Although the
agency has the authority to regulate biotechnology products under
current statutes, the existence of such legitimacy does not necessarily
translate into the most rational and effective means of regulating
biotechnology.4" As with most areas where science and law overlap, the
science has outpaced the law. As a result, the law must move forward to
meet the regulatory challenges posed by advancing biomedical
technologies.
B. Biotechnology Industry
Biotechnology, a broad term, is the "utilization of biologically derived
molecules, structures, cells, or organisms to carry out a specific
process."'  More specifically, biotechnology often refers to particular
technologies such as recombinant DNA45  or cell fusion." These
technologies have commercial applications in various fields, including
the development of human therapies, animal husbandry, agriculture, food
production and environmental management.47
41. Id. at 221.
42. Zachary Coile, Biotech Unbound Industry Welcomes Overhaul of Drug Approval Process,
San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 27, 1995, at D1.
43. Peter Mostow, Reassessing the Scope of Federal Biotechnology Oversight, 10 Pace Envtl. L.
Rev. 227, 265 (1992). Both the U.S. and Japan follow this pattern of basing biotechnology
regulation on existing legislation. This differs from the European Union's approach of issuing
directives specifically designed for biotechnology. See Teresa Pechulis Buono, Note, Biotechnology-
Derived Pharmaceuticals: Harmonizing Regional Regulations, 18 Suffolk Transnat'l L.J. 133
(1995).
44. Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food andDrug Law 971 (1991).
45. Recombinant DNA, in general, refers to molecules developed ouiside living cells by
incorporating DNA fragments in DNA that can replicate in a living cell. Guidelines for Recombinant
DNA Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,496-97 (1994).
46. Cell fusion is the artificial joining of cells yielding one cell with chanacteristics of different
types of cells. See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 44, at 965.
47. Dianne E. Hoffmann, The Biotechnologv Revolution and Its Regulatory Evolution, 38 Drake
L. Rev. 471,474 (1988/1989). These recent technological developments follow an ancient history of
biotechnology. Biotechnology has been used to produce beer and wine and to selectively breed
plants and livestock for over a millennium. See Mostow, supra note 43, at 229. This Comment is
limited to the application of biotechnology to the development of human therapies.
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Although biotechnology was a relatively obscure science twenty years
ago, it has since matured as an industry and a science.4" The United
States biotechnology industry has grown to include more than 1300
companies.49 By the end of 1995, thirty-two biotechnology drugs and
vaccines had been approved by the FDA and more than 230 were in
clinical trials.50 Hundreds of dedicated biotechnology companies (DBCs)
were formed during the early 1980s in the United States.5' DBCs are
almost exclusively a U.S. phenomenon; they are created specifically to
exploit the commercial potential of biotechnology.52 Typically, DBCs
begin by focusing on specific technologies, particular products, and
niche markets.53 Because these companies lack internally generated
revenues during the development stage, start-up costs such as buildings,
equipment, and employees are difficult to fund. 4 To finance these costs
DBCs rely on venture capital, stock offerings, and relationships with
established companies. 5
Commercial exploitation of biotechnology is not accomplished
exclusively by DBCs. Both DBCs and established pharmaceutical
companies utilize the methods and tools of biotechnology in their drug
development efforts. 6 Drug discovery research focuses on the use of
biotechnology because of the unique approach it facilitates,57 allowing a
molecular and cellular level approach to understanding disease, drug-
disease interaction, and drug design. 8
As biotechnology advances beyond the research stage, its products
potentially are subject to numerous statutes designed to protect health
and safety.59 The FDA holds life or death power over these companies,
for they cannot market their products without approval from the FDA.
48. Coile, supra note 42, at DI.
49. W. French Anderson, The Second National Biotechnology Summit, 6 Hum. Gene Therapy
131, 131 (1995).
50. Coile, supra note 42, at DI.
51. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Biotechnology in a Global Economy 3
(1991) [hereinafter Biotechnology in a Global Economy].
52. Id. at 3-5.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Hutt & Merrill, supra note 44, at 973.
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II. MAJOR FORCES DRIVING THE FDA REFORM MOVEMENT
A. Underlying Reasons for FDA Reform
The fundamental factors driving the movement for FDA reform are
the expense, both in terms of money and time, involved in developing
products that are approved by the FDA, and the movement toward
international harmonization of biotechnology products.6" The FDA, with
its "culture of caution,"'" has resisted substantial change to its drug
approval process. There are great disincentives for approving drugs that
ultimately are determined to be unsafe. The FDA reviewer responsible
may be subjected to intense congressional examination, professional
criticism, and ultimately may lose his or her job.62
1. Costs
Cross-national studies have indicated that the FDA's regulatory
scheme is markedly more cumbersome than that of other countries. 63 The
FDA, functioning as a "gatekeeper" for the entry of biotechnologically
derived products, creates significant cost barriers to product
development.' 4 These barriers include the costs of testing to meet
regulatory requirements, the likelihood of delay during the approval
process, and the uncertainty associated with the possible disapproval of
new biotechnology products.65
The exact length of development time and associated costs are
disputed by the various players in the FDA reform arena. Industry
experts state that the total development time required for a new cure to
reach the patient from the laboratory is fifteen years, with an average
cost of $400 million.66 They estimate that delays by the FDA may
60. This is not an exhaustive list of factors. Other factors include intimidation, whereby
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology companies feel they cannot question the FDA's decisions
without prejudicing future drug approval applications, and concerns that agency problems cost lives.
See Green, supra note 6.
61. Donna U. Vogt et al., FDA Reform Issues in the 104th Congress, CRS Issue Brief, Updated
Jan. 17, 1996, at CRS-4.
62. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and "Privatization"--The Drug Approval Process, 50
Food & Drug L.J. 203, 214 (1995).
63. Note, supra note 2, at 2014.
64. The President's Council on Competitiveness, Report on National Biotechnology Policy I 1
(1991).
65. Id.




account for as much as ninety percent of the average cost.67 The FDA,
however, estimates that the total development time has remained at
eleven and one-half years since 1980.68
An example of the disparity between each group's figures is the length
of time needed to review new drug applications, the final step in the drug
approval process. According to a recent Government Accounting Office
(GAO) study of drug approval procedures, the FDA has reduced the time
it takes to clear new drug applications before they reach the market by
more than forty percent over five years.6 9 However, even in light of this
positive statistic, the agency still takes nearly three times the limit set by
federal law.7" By comparison, drug approval in the European Union
(EU), depending on the member state, ranges from six months to three
years,7' and in Japan the standard drug approval time is eighteen months
for prescription drugs and ten months for nonprescription drugs.72
Furthermore, drug makers say the GAO report is misleading because it
focuses only on new drug review time,73 while FDA regulatory authority
extends over almost all of the drug development process.74
Regardless of which party's time estimate is the most accurate, the
time and money needed to meet FDA requirements can serve as large
67. Executive Update FDA Reforms Sidetracked by Budget, Medicare Fight, Investors Bus. Daily,
Oct. 12, 1995, atA4.
68. John Schwartz, Americans Receive New Medicines as Quickly as Others, FDA Asserts; Red
Tape Does Not Keep Lifesaving Drugs Off Market, Kessler Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1995, at A3.
69. FDA Overhaul Is Sought Despite Some Improvement, supra note 66.
70. Id.
71. Rosemarie Kanusky, Comment, Pharmaceutical Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations
Among the United States. the European Economic Community, and Japan, 16 Hous. J. Int'l. L. 665,
682 (1994).
72. Id. at 686.
73. FDA Overhaul Is Sought Despite Some Improvement, supra note 66. Another factor behind
this apparent decrease in FDA drug review process time is the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of
1992.21 U.S.C. § 310. This law requires pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to pay a fee
to the FDA for each drug submitted. The money, a projected total of $332 million, is being used to
hire 600 more reviewers by 1997 and to speed up the drug review process with performance targets.
Jennifer Reingold, Under Watchful Eyes: What's Behind the Sudden Improvement in the FDA "s
Notoriously Slow Drug Approval Process, 164 Fin. World 40, at 40 (1995).
74. FDA Overhaul Is Sought Despite Some Improvement, supra note 66. There are discrete phases
through which a new product must pass before a new drug application (NDA) is sought for entry into
the market. First, the company sponsoring the product must complete extensive laboratory and
animal testing to collect preliminary data concerning the drug's safety and biological activity. Then,
the company must file an investigational new drug application, which, if not rejected by the FDA,
enables the company to begin human clinical trials. These clinical trials occur in three distinct
phases, the purpose of which is to evaluate safety and efficacy. After the clinical trials are
completed, the NDA is filed for FDA review. See Rutherford, supra note 62, at 212-13.
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obstacles to biotechnology companies. Regulatory delays may cause
companies to bum up their capital before completing their research, or
drive up the final cost of a new drug when it eventually reaches the
market. A delay of one year in marketing can represent a ten million
dollar loss to a company because of increased regulatory costs and lost
sales.7" In addition, delays in drug approval affect small biotechnology
companies disproportionately because these companies depend on an
occasional or rare superstar drug to recoup research costs.7 6 FDA reforms
could free company time and money, previously spent on regulatory
issues, for increased research and capital investment. Reforms could also
bode well for venture capitalists, shareholders, and other investors.
Industry advocates are hopeful that the reforms will lure back venture
capitalists and strengthen investor interest in publicly held biotechnology
companies.77
The biotechnology industry is an important part of the U.S. economy
and has improved America's quality of life. However, the extensive
cost of time and money needed to achieve FDA approval may push the
biotechnology industry to move their production, research, or both
abroad to avoid delays in getting their product to market.79 If American
companies locate abroad, such action may delay Americans' access to
new pharmaceuticals and hurt the American economy by shifting not
only jobs, but knowledge and technology out of the country.
75. John Patrick Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal Liseases: Desperate
Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 925, 936 (1991).
76. Id. at 936 n.94.
77. In general, a biotechnology company requires more than $450 million to reach operating
profitability. Historically, public investment capital has been accessible for promising biotechnology
companies, beginning at a relatively early stage in their development. J. Casey McGlynn & Grant
Heidrich, Biotechnology Financing Remains a Tough Row to Hoe, 13 Bio/Technology, 638, at 638
(1995). Major sections of the investment community have abandoned biotechnology due to
overselling and failed clinical trials. See Anderson, supra note 49, at 13 1. Now it s more difficult for
companies to raise the necessary funding, without which they cannot survive. "Nineteen of the 100
companies in Cowen & Company's (Boston, MA) biotechnology-tracking univ..rse now have less
than 1 year of cash reserves, based on their burn rate, while 33 of these firms have 1-2 years of cash,
and 18 of them have 2-3 years of cash." McGlynn & Heidrich, supra, at 638. ,fter a large boom
period in the early 1990s, public-market financing for biotechnology decreased dramatically. Many
investors began to realize that promising science and research do not necessarily translate into
successful product development. Id. at 638-39.
78. Competitiveness of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, supra note 7, at 20.
79. Id. at 33. A Health Industry Manufacturing Association survey reported that 50% of the more
than 500 device makers surveyed had moved some clinical trials of new medical devices overseas
and 75% planned to move their trials to Europe. See Rick Henderson, Prescription Remedies,
Reason, Aug., 18, 1995, at 27. Although this survey was of medical device companies, it is likely




Global economic factors are also supplying pressure on the United
States to change its regulatory process concerning biotechnology
products. The major competitors in the international biotechnology
industry are the United States, the EU, and Japan."0 These entities
account for seventy-five percent of the world's pharmaceutical market
and generate ninety percent of all pharmaceutical research.8 Although
the goal of drug regulatory agencies in foreign countries, as well as the
United States, is to ensure that safe and effective drugs reach the market,
these agencies typically act in a unilateral fashion."2 Differences in the
approval process for marketing biotechnology products discourage
international competition, to the detriment of both manufacturers and
patients.8 This is because, at present, a new pharmaceutical product must
be evaluated, tested, and approved in each potential market before it can
be legally sold. Inconsistent international regulations tend to increase
costs, both in terms of time and money."
Regulatory authorities world wide continue to work together to create
a more cooperative and complementary system of pharmaceutical
regulation." Achievement of this goal is furthered by the International
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH)."6 Established in
1989, ICH is a tripartite effort between the United States, the EU, and
Japan to address the regulatory issues of pharmaceutical drugs.87 A
80. Buono, supra note 43. A nation's competitiveness in biotechnology can be viewed in different
ways. Competitiveness can be viewed in terms of who ultimately owns a company, or it can be
viewed in terms of where jobs and skills are located. Biotechnology in a Global Economy, supra
note 51, at 21. The competitiveness of U.S.-developed biotechnology products is also dependent on
other issues such as fair trade practices, protection of intellectual property, and tax policies. Id. at 3.
81. Kanusky, supra note 71, at 667.
82. Jordan, supra note 16, at 491.
83. Buono, supra note 43.
84. Kanusky, supra note 71, at 667.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Buono, supra note 43. Although the ICH is open to worldwide participation, the emphasis is
on the U.S., the EU, and Japan because of their importance in the biotechnology industry. See
Kanusky, supra note 71, at 667. The general goals of the ICH are twofold. One goal is to decrease
regulatory problems associated with pharmaceutical manufacturers' compliance with the differing
regulations of the various countries, lower research and development costs for manufacturers, and
indirectly lower the cost of drugs to consumers of all countries. The second goal is to increase the
safety, quality, and efficacy of pharmaceuticals for consumers of all nations. Joseph G. Contrera,
Comment, The Food and Drug Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization:
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harmonized system would enable regulated industries, such as the
biotechnology industry, to redirect time and financial resources to
product development because of the reduction in regIxlatory costs.
88
Consumers may also gain from harmonization through increased and
earlier access to new medicines.
819
The formation of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency
(EMEA), a centralized agency designed to standardize and. accelerate the
approval process for certain new drugs,9" may increase pressure on the
FDA to reform.9 The EMEA will serve as a centralized approval agency
and as an oversight body for a decentralized mutual recognition
procedure. Through this system, when one EU member state approves a
new drug, it will be approved in all member states, unless cause exists for
disapproval. 92 Because of this centralization of the European drug review
process, the EU will be the largest single market for medicines.93
Combined with what may prove to be less stringent regulations,94 the
U.S. biotechnology industry may be encouraged to target the EU for
first-market approval.
International harmonization, to some degree, is an inevitable and
worthy objective as the world progresses towards a more global
economy. Various obstacles within the United States, however, currently
confront this movement. These obstacles include constitutional
difficulties with delegating decision making authority to a foreign
government,95 concerns about safety risks to the American public,96 and
How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U.
927, 928 (1995).
88. Jordan, supra note 16, at 499.
89. Id.
90. Note, supra note 2, at 2018.
91. Rutherford, supra note 62, at 221.
92. Note, supra note 2, at 2018.
93. Rutherford, supra note 62, at 222.
94. It is unclear yet whether the EMEA regulatory scheme is less stringent than that of the FDA.
The EMEA seeks "adequate evidence of safety, efficacy and quality" when reviewing drug
applications. However, "adequate" and "quality" are not clearly defined and may result in less
demanding standards. See Rutherford, supra note 62, at 221. Additionally, somt.e fear that American
and European regulatory agencies could decrease regulatory standards in order to gain a competitive
advantage. See Note, supra note 2, at 2024.
95. This is essentially an example of the nondelegation doctrine, which could be overcome as long
as the FDA retained the final authority to object to, and thereby not approve, specific new products.
See Note, supra note 2, at 2022.
96. Again, the fear behind this argument is that the risk of adverse reactions may increase if U.S.
decisions about the safety and efficacy of new products are based on decisions made by foreign
agencies. See id. at 2024.
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cultural and demographic differences between populations.97 Any
successful future reform must address these barriers.
B. Key Players in the Movement for FDA Reform
Almost everyone has become involved in the recent dispute over FDA
reform. The Republican-controlled Congress has acted as a catalyst.98
Trade associations have joined the fray in an effort to benefit from the
Republican emphasis on deregulation.99 The Clinton Administration and
the FDA itself have also become involved in an attempt to stave off
drastic legislative action. Even consumer groups have become more
vocal in critiquing the FDA and proposed reforms.
Neither Congress, nor the Clinton Administration, is particularly
capable of developing a rational regulatory policy for biotechnologically
derived products because neither has the necessary expertise.' The
FDA, on the other hand, has technical competence and familiarity with
the specialized subject area.' Growing intolerance with the FDA's
ability to self regulate, however, may cause Congress or the
Administration to impose new regulatory schemes on the FDA.
The types of reform measures advocated by the various players can be
categorized as either incremental or radical in nature. Incremental reform
tends to build on the existing structural system, only making slight
modifications. This type of reform can be seen in much of the pending
legislation as well as in the changes proposed by the Administration.
Incremental reforms stand a better chance of being adopted because
97. Different racial and ethnic groups may react differently to a new biotechnologically derived
product, such that a drug shown to be safe and effective in one population may be less so in another.
For a discussion of possible methods of mitigating these concerns with respect to the United States
and Europe, see id. at 2224-5.
98. Green, supra note 6.
99. In addition to proposing methods of FDA reform, the regulated industries have contributed to
members of Congress in an effort to further their cause. The Center for Responsive Politics reported
that political action committees or individuals connected to pharmaceutical and health products
companies donated more than $t million to Congresspersons and Senators from January to June of
1995, 70% of which went to Republicans. Robert Cohen, Fixing the FDA As Regulators Slow
MedicalAdvances, Republicans Go on Offensive, San Diego Union-Trib., Jan. 28, 1996, at G4.
100. Mostow, supra note 43, at 266.
101. Id. The FDA, as a federal agency, has the ability to formulate its own rules and procedures.
Rules promulgated pursuant to § 701(a) of the FDCA are subject only to the informal notice and
comment procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553. Hutt & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1245. Regulations,
representing legal requirements, and guidelines, representing general principles, comprise the FDA's
principal administrative rules. Kanusky, supra note 71, at 695-96.
Washington Law Review
fewer competing interests exist than with dramatic reforms.'0 2 Other
suggestions for reform, put forth by various conservative organizations,
are more radical, seeking to dramatically alter the current system, making
it, in most cases, unrecognizable. 3
1. Consumer Group Organizations
Consumer groups are important players in the effort to change the
regulatory process governing biotechnology products. As these
organizations become more active, however, the lack of consensus
among the groups concerning the type and degree of FDA reform to
promote becomes apparent. Citizens for a Sound Economy, a grassroots
organization formed to promote market-based solutions to public policy
problems,"° believes Senator Kassebaum's bill does not provide enough
change with regard to consumer access to drugs.'05 Their reasoning,
based on the FDA's inability to meet the statutory requirements for
review times," 6 leads them to advccate, among other options, a private
approval process.0 7 The Patients' Coalition, a group of independent
organizations representing Americans with various serious and life-
threatening diseases, fears that proposed FDA changes may jeopardize
102. Sen. Hatch Prefers "Incremental" Approach to FDA Reform; Rep. Barton Calls for
Legislation, 3 Tan Sheet, May 29, 1995.
103. A unifying theme of many of the conservztive proposals is an almost complete elimination of
the FDA's authority to prevent a new drug from reaching the market. The Cato Institute, for instance,
advocates restricting the agency to considerations of drug safety, leaving decisions on a medicine's
effectiveness to the market. See Daniel Green, Obstacle Course for Drug Prodicers: Pressure for
Reform of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is Growing, Fin. Times, Aug. 21, 1995. The
Competitive Enterprise Institution wants to turn the FDA into an advisory agency, allowing a never-
approved drug to be used "pre-label," provided there is consent of the physician and disclosure to,
and consent of, the patient. See Bruce Ramsey, Time to Consider Dramatic Change at FDA, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 27, 1995, at B4. Under this scheme the drug developer would never have to
get FDA approval, though they may seek it for other reasons such as marketing or because certain
managed care organizations, or government funded medical programs, require it. The Progress and
Freedom Foundation, a think tank associated with Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt
Gingrich, wants to privatize the parts of the FDA that oversee drug and medical device testing. See
Laurie MeGinley, Group with Links to Gingrich Urges Broad FDA Reform, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1996,
at B6. Under the Progress and Freedom Foundation's FDA reform proposal, the FDA would retain
final approval for product marketing, but its primary role would be certifying the quality of the
private certification bodies. Id.
104. Citizens for a Sound Economy Scrutinizes FDA Review Times, U.S. Newswire, Feb. 20,
1996.
105. Karen Riley, Senator Wants FDA to Speed up Kassebaum Seeks Dramaic Changes, Wash.
Times, Nov. 4, 1995, at Al.
106. Citizens for a Sound Economy Scrutinizes FDA Review Times, supra note 104.
107. Rutherford, supra note 62, at 206.
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safety and efficacy standards.' ° They do not support setting arbitrary
statutory deadlines, as appear in Senator Kassebaum's bill. Such
deadlines, they fear, would lead to either quick rejection of valuable
drugs, or premature approval of dangerous or ineffective drugs. The
Patients' Coalition would rather see the FDA provided with additional
resources dedicated exclusively to the agency's approval process."0 9
These consumer groups may influence Congressional decisions, through
lobbying, and should not be dismissed lightly.
2. The Biotechnology Industry
The biotechnology industry has been very vocal and aggressive in its
attempts to generate FDA reform beneficial to its interests."' One trade
organization representing the industry, the Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), has been especially active in promoting the
industry's point of view. Although it would prefer legislative action
creating a more industry-friendly regulatory environment,", it is
approaching FDA reform from both a legislative and administrative
perspective."' BIO has drafted legislation with the goal of having it
introduced in Congress. The objectives of its legislation include
increasing the industry's ability to rely on agency standards of review,"'
predictability of agency actions,11 4 adherence to time limitations," i5 and
acceptability of new drugs approved by the EMEA or the United
Kingdom Medicines Control Agency." 6
Although overall the biotechnology industry supports improvement of
the FDA regulatory process, different perspectives within the industry
108. Safety and Efficacy for Drugs in Peril, Patients Group Warns Senate, U.S. Newswire, Feb.
21, 1996.
109. Id.
110. The pharmaceutical industry has also been a significant player, namely through the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association. See Sweeping FDA Reforms Gain Ground,
21 Health Legis. & Reg., June 7, 1995.
111. Legislation would provide a more reliable framework for the industry to operate within,
because it could not be easily altered by future administrations. BIO Welcomes U.S. FDA Proposals,
supra note 31.
112. Eric Convey, Top 96 in 96 Sector Snapshot: Biotech, Drug Companies on the Brink, Boston
Herald, Jan. 16, 1996, at N3 1.
113. BIO Draft Legislation § 6(a)(4)(C) (Oct. 31, 1995) (on file with the Washington Law
Review).
114. Id.§8.
115. Id. §§ 6(a)(4)(E), 8, 10(4).
116. Id. § 10(2).
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make cohesion difficult. The industry predominantly supports
incremental reform. One reason trade associations are not supportive of
dramatic change, such as large scale privatization of the FDA review
responsibilities, may be the political unlikelihood of such reasures being
enacted. BIO, for instance, has stated that it does not support blanket
third-party review and does not expect such proposals to be incorporated
into legislation enacted in the near future."7 Furthermore, it believes that
such attempts at privatization of tae agency would be too dramatic a
change for many Americans, removing the element of acceptability
currently found in FDA approved drugs. In its draft legislation, however,
BIO advocates privatization of some FDA functions, such as review of a
new drug application, where it is effective and efficient to do so." 8
Many critics have suggested that established biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies want to retain some of the current FDA
structure because of the potential advantages it offers these companies." 9
Established companies have expended years of effort and money
cultivating relationships with the agency and they may use the system to
their advantage, blocking smaller, newer companies from competing in
the market. 2 This could be the industry's rationale behind wanting to
avoid extreme change and wanting to maintain the FDA's stamp of
approval for marketing purposes. Many younger biotechnology
companies, however, also seek to retain the FDA approval, viewing it as
essential in helping them establish an image of safety and credibility.'
The biotechnology industry's stance on altering the FDA raises the
specter of agency capture. Agency capture occurs when a regulated
industry, such as the biotechnology industry, is able to use its political
influence to force the agency to promulgate regu',ations that are
preferential to the industry and perhaps contrary to the agency's intended
purpose.'22 The agency itself may be co-opted into acceding to capture.
For instance, the FDA wants a vigorous drug industry to maintain its
power and jurisdiction.'23 Additionally, FDA employees may want to
work for the companies they are regulating once they leave the agency. 1 4
117. Politics and Policy FDA Reform: Package of Bills to be Introduced in House, 4 APN-HE,
Feb. 20, 1996.
118. BIO Draft Legislation, supra note 113, § 6 (a)(4)(B).
119. Green, supra note 6.
120. Id.
121. Glenn Hess, FDA Overhaul, Chemical Marketing Rep., Sept. 18, 1995, at SR28.
122. C. Frederick Beckner, III, Note, The FDA's War on Drugs, 82 Geo. U. 529, 540 (1993).




The agency, therefore, may choose to promote industry goodwill by
altering its regulations to better meet the needs and demands of the
biotechnology industry. Currently this does not seem to be a major
concern, as relations between the FDA and the biotechnology industry
have been adversarial.12
5
III. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORM MEASURES
A. Congressional Efforts
There are a number of bills in Congress aimed at FDA reform. 26
National attention has been split between Representative Burr's bill 2
7
and Senator Kassebaum's bill. 121 Comparisons of these two bills,
particularly in terms of their effectiveness in addressing the factors
driving the reform movement provide insight into the direction of future
reform and the hurdles that will have to be overcome.
1. Senator Kassebaum s Bill
Senator Kassebaum's bill has received much national attention. This
bill, the Food and Drug Administration Performance and Accountability
Act of 1995, has five major themes and nine distinct titles. The major
themes, as stated by Senator Kassebaum,'29 include altering the FDA
mission statement to facilitate the development and availability of safe
and effective products, 30 imposing statutory deadlines for agency
action,'3 ' authorizing contracting with outside experts for product review
under certain circumstances, 32 expanding access to investigational new
125. Hutt & Merrill, supra note 44, at 1240.
126. In addition to the major bills discussed below, a number of bills addressing FDA reform have
been previously introduced in Congress. The bills introduced in the House of Representatives
include the FDA Modernization Act of 1995, H.R. 1742, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995); the Life
Extending and Life Saving Drug Act, H.R. 1995, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995); and the Life
Extending and Life Saving Device Act, H.R. 2290, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995).
127. H.R. 3199, 104th Cong., 2d Sess (1996).
128. S. 1477, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995). Senator Kassebaum has historically advanced
legislation favored by the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. She has, however,
announced her upcoming retirement from the Senate. Pink Sheet, Jan. 22, 1996, at T&G-13.
129. Vogt, supra note 61, at CRS-8.
130. S. 1477 § 102(l).
131. Id. § 103.
132. Id. § 743(d)(1).
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pharmaceuticals and medical devices,133 and establishing a collaborative
clinical testing and review process.'34 Because it is comprised of such
distinct areas, Senator Kassebaum's bill may be divided accordingly and
voted on separately.'35
The reform proposal augments the FDA's role as facilitator of the
process by which the biotechnology industry places their products in the
marketplace.'36 While the bill is advantageous in that it attempts to
address many of the problems currently plaguing the regulatory regime
for drug and biologic approval, the bill does have potential flaws. Some
of the problems apparent in Senator Kassebaum's bill are the result of
good intentions that lack either sufficient penalties oir oversight and
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that those intentions are
implemented.
a. Provisions Concerning Product Approval Time Either Lack
Sufficient Enforcement Mechanisms Or Misplace Such Mechanisms
Although the bill provides for decreasing the time for product
approval, it is hampered by the lack of enforcement mechanisms. For
example, although the bill would require the establishment of standards
for eliminating backlogs,'37 it offers no good method of enforcement.
What is lacking is an entity such as an external, independent performance
panel with the power to discipline FDA officials.'38
Furthermore, the provision providing for the approval of a new drug
in the United States, once it has been approved in the United Kingdom or
EU,'39 is also too relaxed to have significant impact on the agency's
approval process. This provision originally had the potenatial to increase
the speed of approval for such a drug. If the Secretary did not act on an
application within thirty days following the expiration of the time period,
established in the standard, for a product that had met the marketing
requirements of the EU or the United Kingdom, it would be deemed
133. Id. Title II.
134. Id. Title III and IV.
135. FDA Reform Should Focus on Consensus Issues First, Rep. Fox Urges House Leadership;
Commerce Committee May Produce Several Separate Bills, Pink Sheet, Jan. 8, 1996, at 3.
136. Vogt, supra note 61, at CRS-9.
137. S. 1477 § 103(3)(B).
138. Henry 1. Miller, FDA Reform Is Needed, But Not Like This, Wash. Times, Feb. 20, 1996, at
A15.
139. S. 1477 § 743(c)(1).
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approved by the FDA as well. 4 ' In the committee approved bill, the
provision was amended so that it only applies to drugs that offer "a
significant improvement over existing approved products,"' 4 not to all
drugs. Additionally, failure of the FDA to act on such a request would no
longer result in the product being deemed approved. 42
In other areas where there are mechanisms in place to ensure
adherence to the legislative provisions, the emphasis on compliance with
statutory guidelines may be misplaced. For instance, the FDA
Commissioner, Dr. David Kessler objects to the requirement in Senator
Kassebaum's legislation that the FDA act on all new drug applications,'43
not just those for treating life-threatening diseases, within 180 days.'" If
the agency does not comply with the statutory deadlines by 1998, it must
cede parts of the approval process to private companies. ' Kessler
predicts that rather than striving to meet the deadline, the FDA will
simply deny problematic applications.'46 It remains unclear, however,
whether the use of outside review panels would actually be more
effective or efficient than merely hiring more FDA reviewers."'
b. Harmonization Efforts Lack Strength
The problem of unenforceable provisions also is inherent in how
Senator Kassebaum's bill treats U.S. harmonization efforts. Under
140. Id. There was, however, a loophole which the FDA could have used to deny such approval.
In order for foreign approval to have triggered approval in the United States, the FDA would have
had to have already extended its review time beyond its statutory time limit. The approval could have
been denied simply by notifying the applicant in writing that the application was disapproved. Id.
141. Revised Kassebaum FDA Reform Measure Greatly Scales Back EU/UK Device Approval
Allowance; Senate Labor Mark-up Postponed Until Week of March 18, 22 Gray Sheet, Mar. 18,
1996.
142. Kassebaum FDA Reform Mark Allows More Discretion For FDA: Supplemental Approvals
Based On Expert Opinion Would Be Allowed But Not Required In Latest Bill, 58 Pink Sheet, Mar.
18, 1996.
143. Statement by David A. Kessler before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources,
United States Senate, Feb. 21, 1996, available in Westlaw 1996 WL 7135603.
144. Senator Kassebaum's bill would require the FDA to act within 120 days on applications for
new drugs to treat life-threatening diseases or other disorders with no approved treatment. All other
FDA regulated products would have a 180 day time line. S. 1477 § 103.
145. Id. § 743(d).
146. Hearing of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, Changes at the FDA. 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess, available in Westlaw 1996 WL 5508818 (statement of Dr. Kessler, Commissioner
of the FDA).
147. Donna U. Vogt, Food and Drug Administration: Current Reform Initiatives, CRS Issue
Brief, Dec. 8, 1995, at CRS-5.
Washington Law Review
section 302 of the bill, the Secretary is required to publish criteria for the
type and amount of information relating to the safety of an investigation
drug. The Secretary must, however, only take into account the
recommendations of the ICH.'48 This is a very loose requirement, as there
is no mechanism to ensure that the FDA seriously considers these
recommendations. In section 402 of the bill there is the same vague
requirement that the Secretary consider recommendations of the ICH
when determining reasonable data requirements for an application
submitted to the FDA. 49
C. The Biotechnology Industry Will Seek Additional Refonm
While Senator Kassebaum's bill addresses many of fae concerns of
the biotechnology industry, the bill still allows for more deference to the
agency than the industry feels is appropriate. The biotechnology industry
applauds the attempt of Senator Kassebaum's bill to shift the FDA's
orientation from that of a gatekeeper to that of a facilitator. However, it
is not clear that merely changing the FDA's mission, from one of
safeguarding safety and efficacy to one of pro-actively facilitating
medical advances, can actually impact an agency sleeped in risk
aversion. "0
The biotechnology industry seeks the submission of less information
on drugs and medical products, a reduction in the amount and type of
testing required, and specific timetables for FDA responses to
applications.' Senator Kassebaum's bill, if enacted, will aid the
biotechnology industry in achieving some of these goals. However, as is
often the case with incremental reform measures, it will be but a stepping
stone in a continuum of reform efforts.
2. Representative Burr's Bill
The Drug and Biological Products Reform Act of 1996 has the
advantage of specificity, allowing more precision to be incorporated into
the bill with less left to be addressed at a later date. Divided into twenty-
six sections, Representative Burr's bill differs notably from Senator
Kassebaum's in its use of third-party reviewers to reduce approval
148. S. 1477 § 302.
149. Id. § 741(d).
150. Miller, supra note 138.
151. Cohen, supra note 99.
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time.'52 The House bill, regardless of dedicating a section to
harmonization, does not, however, adequately promote international
harmonization.
a. The Use of Third-Party Reviewers May Lower Product Approval
Costs, But at What Price?
Representative Burr's bill attempts to decrease the costs associated
with bringing a new biotechnology product to market. For example, the
bill provides for shorter FDA response periods in areas such as requests
to begin clinical investigations'53 and agency response to dispute
resolution recommendations.' 54 The primary attempt to decrease the cost
of product approval, at least in temporal terms, is seen in the option for
third-party marketing approval.'55
Under provisions in Representative Burr's bill, companies seeking
marketing approval could choose to hire third-party reviewers instead of
the FDA. 56 These reviewers would be accredited by the FDA, 57 with the
FDA retaining final approval authority.'58 However, the use of such
third-party reviewers is prone to conflicts of interest. Objectivity will be
lost when the future business of an organization, paid to review products,
depends on the organization's previous history of granting favorable
decisions.
b. The Section Dedicated to Harmonization Is Ineffective
Section 19 of Representative Burr's bill, specifically addressing
harmonization, suffers from the same vagueness and lack of sufficient
enforcement mechanisms as Senator Kassebaum's bill. The Secretary,
under Representative Burr's bill, is required to participate in meetings
with other countries to discuss harmonization efforts. 5 9 Such a provision,
is not, however, particularly demanding or likely to induce serious
harmonization efforts.
152. H.R. 3199, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1995).
153. Id.§3.
154. Id. § 9. The Secretary has thirty days to respond to recommendations, otherwise the
recommendations of the person or panel are deemed to be those of the Secretary. Id.
155. Id. § 7.
156. Id. § 8(a).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 7.
159. Id. § 19.
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C. The Biotechnology Industry Is Likely To Favor Burr's Bill
The option of seeking third-party market approval may be desired by
members of the biotechnology industry. Such a system could increase the
speed with which biotechnology products are reviewed.6 The discretion
allowed by this provision to the company seeking market approval may
enable the biotechnology industry to achieve faster approval times
without sacrificing the element of public trust derived from the FDA
stamp of approval.
B. Reform Promoted by the Clinton Administration and the FDA.
As efforts to enact legislative reform of the FDA have intensified,
administrative solutions have been proffered in an attempt to prevent
radical reform by Congress. The Clinton Administration, through Vice
President Gore's "Reinventing Government" program Ibr streamlining
the federal bureaucracy, has announced regulatory reforms aimed at
simplifying the FDA regulations. 6' At least two of these reforms have
been directed toward the FDA's treatment of biotechnology products. 62
These reforms are intended to ease the manufacturing requirements, 63
allow for development of a pilot program to experiment with third-party
review of low to moderate risk medical devices,"6 and harmonize the
FDA's drug and device testing requirements with those of other
countries. 6 '
160. Anita Womack, FDA To Announce Third-Party Review For Devices, Rep. Says, Dow Jones
Int'l. News, Apr. 16. 1996.
161. Administration Promotes FDA Reform, 21 Health Legis. & Reg., Apr. 12, 1995.
162. In April of 1995, the White House released a National Performance Review by President
Clinton and Vice President Gore describing a 13-point plan for reinventing drug and medical device
regulation. Clinton, Wyden Offer FDA Reforms; Several Match BIO Recommendations, supra note
5. Another plan, "Reinventing the Regulation of Drugs made from Biotechnology," was issued in
November 1995. Rhein, supra note 5. A third plan introduced by the Clinton Administration serves
to increase the speed with which cancer drugs, potentially products of biotechnology, are approved.
Politics & Policy FDA: To Speed up Cancer Drug Approval Times, 4 APN-HE. Mar. 29, 1996.
163. More specifically, the plans would allow manufacturers of drugs and biologics to, under
certain circumstances, change the way they manufacture an approved drug without prior
authorization from the FDA, and would allow manufacturers of biological drugs to get licenses for
pilot facilities instead of requiring them to build full-scale manufacturing plants. Clinton, Wyden
Offer FDA Reforms; Several Match BIO Recommendations, supra note 5.
164. Id.
165. Id. One recent plan, "Reinventing the Regulation of Drugs Made fiom Biotechnology,"
would, among other things, eliminate the requirement for establishment license applications for
"well-characterized therapeutic biotech drugs," and eliminate FDA's lot-b)-lot release for such
drugs. Rhein, supra note 5.
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The FDA, while actively participating in the incremental reforms
proposed by the Clinton Administration, stresses that it can meet
Congress' expectations on its own without radical FDA reform.'66 Many
critics, however, think that by instituting self reform, the FDA has shifted
the focus of debate from the question of whether reform is necessary, to
how far the reforms will go.'67
Many commentators have questioned whether administrative solutions
are legally adequate or desirable, because such approaches tend to be
more susceptible to the whims of changes in administration. 6
Legislative solutions, although even more political in nature, may be the
only relatively permanent and legally defensible option because
legislation is more difficult to overrule and subject to greater input from
the affected parties.'69
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE FDA
Any effective emerging FDA reform must balance the industry's
interest in time and cost efficiency, the government's interest in assuring
the safety and efficacy of new products, and the public interest in access
to new potentially life-saving, yet safe and effective products. FDA
reform, however, has become such a contentious issue, with so many
players, that is difficult to predict a precise outcome, let alone
recommend one.
Numerous problems await FDA reformers. One problem is the simple
fact that the general public does not perceive a crisis in drug approval so
there is no populist groundswell for systemic change. 70 Yet
congressional interest has been increasing, as demonstrated by the
growing number of bills which have been introduced. This surge in
congressional activity, however, may be too late. Election year politics
may stymie any comprehensive reform movement. It is unlikely the
166. Burlington Argues for FDA "Discretion" in Making Reforms Rather than "Prescriptive"
Legislation; CDRHer Criticizes Efforts to "Gut" Efficacy Standard, 21 Gray Sheet, Dec. 18, 1995.
167. Green, supra note 6. The FDA Commissioner, Dr. David Kessler, objects, however, to the
proposals that the FDA contract out portions of the drug approval process to private companies.
Kessler Says Some FDA Reforms Could Slow Process, Cong. Daily, Feb. 21, 1996. Kessler fears
contracting out will result in problems with conflicts of interest, inconsistency of reviews, and
potential disclosure of proprietary information. Hearing of the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee, Changes at the FDA, supra note 146.
168. Korwek, supra note 4, at 150.
169. Id.
170. Henderson, supra note 79.
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momentum which has been generated can rapidly resolve the conflict
between the House and Senate bills, or result in the passage of a bill
acceptable to President Clinton.
Regardless of the outcome of the presidential election, the movement
for FDA reform will reemerge in 1997, following the election. Consumer
groups, with a large and tangible stake in the outcome, may provide
some of the momentum necessary to make FDA reforn an important
issue in the years following the 1996 Presidential election. Economic
pressures and the ever increasing business stakes of the biotechnology
industry will also contribute significantly to the momentum for reform.
Regardless of the status of the Kassebaum and Burr bills at the end of
this year, the controversy concerning FDA reform as it pertains to the
biotechnology industry illustrates what some of the objectives and goals
will be for future reform efforts. Foremost among these goals is the
fundamental need to decrease the time and cost of product approval and
increase the United States' involvement in international harmonization. It
is important, therefore, that the law be flexible and applicable to new,
rapidly developing biomedical technologies. Until these goals are
realized, the FDA will remain unacceptably cumbersome and
unresponsive to the ever changing advances of the biotechnology
industry.
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